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1
Abstract
In complete markets economies (Sandroni [15]), or in economies with
Pareto optimal outcomes (Blume and Easley [9]), the market selection hy-
pothesis holds, as long as traders have identical discount factors. Traders
who survive must have beliefs that merge with the truth. We show that in
incomplete markets, regardless of traders’ discount factors, the market selects
for a range of beliefs, at least some of which do not merge with the truth.
We also show that impatient traders with incorrect beliefs can survive and
that these incorrect beliefs impact prices. These beliefs may be chosen so
that they are far from the truth.
Keywords: Incomplete markets, market selection hypothesis, belief se-
lection.
JEL Codes: D51, D52, D80, G10.
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1 Introduction
Do markets select for correct expectations? The market selection hypothesis
(Alchian [1], Friedman [12]) is one of the longest standing conjectures in eco-
nomics. Traders who form more accurate predictions about future returns
make more money at the expense of those who don’t. In the long run all
traders with inaccurate beliefs are driven out of the market and the only sur-
viving ones have correct expectations. This hypothesis has a strong intuitive
appeal and, if true, provides a robust justification to the assumption of ratio-
nal expectations in both microeconomic and macroeconomic models. Given
that long run market outcomes only reflect correct expectations, economists
interested in the long run may as well assume rational expectations from the
outset.
To test the validity of this conjecture, suppose that two traders disagree
on the probability with which a particular state of nature occurs. If this
disagreement does not have an impact on asymptotic wealth accumulation
and survival, then Friedman’s conjecture does not hold. Hence the market
selection hypothesis requires that the trader with correct expectations is able
to accumulate wealth at the other trader’s expense by betting against him
on the future realisation of that particular state of nature. It is only when
there is a market that allows the two traders to make these bets that the
trader with correct beliefs can actually accumulate more wealth than the
other trader and drive him out of the market. When a state of nature can
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only be partially insured against by the existing market structure, the link
between accuracy of beliefs and survival becomes weaker.
We know that when markets are complete [15], or when the allocation
is Pareto optimal [9] correct beliefs are selected for by market forces1. In
particular, heterogeneity of beliefs does not persist, and all surviving traders
have either correct beliefs or beliefs which merge with the true probability
distribution. Blume and Easley [9] argue by providing counterexamples that
the same need not hold when markets are incomplete. In this paper we
show that in incomplete markets economies, regardless of traders’ discount
factors, the set of beliefs which are consistent with traders’ survival contains
beliefs that are not equivalent to the true probability distribution. So the
market selection hypothesis does not hold in incomplete markets. We also
show in a class of economies that there exist surviving traders with beliefs
that do not merge with the truth and these beliefs matter: were they to
adopt correct beliefs, equilibrium prices would change and they may no longer
survive. These surviving traders may be more impatient than other traders
with correct beliefs. This stands in stark contrast to Blume and Easley’s
result that surviving traders must have either beliefs closer to the truth
than other traders or be suﬃciently patient to compensate for their incorrect
beliefs.
We consider an economy with an open ended future and a finite number
1This assumes that traders discount future consumption at the same rate so that their
degree of impatience does not aﬀect their survival.
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of traders. Every period, traders trade securities to hedge their stochastic
endowment risk. Preferences are of the expected utility form and utility
from future consumption is discounted at a rate that is allowed to diﬀer
across traders. There are many consumption goods each period, but the
securities pay oﬀ only in terms of a numeraire good. Also, securities are
short-lived. These last two assumptions do not aﬀect the intuition of the
result but considerably simplify the analysis and guarantee existence of an
equilibrium (see Magill and Quinzii ([14])). Otherwise, the asset structure is
rather general in that the payoﬀ matrix may change from period to period.
The infinite horizon economy that we model satisfies conditions for existence
of an equilibrium with a transversality condition. This requires traders not
to borrow and roll over their debt ad infinitum.
Our first result is that traders who survive admit beliefs that are not
equivalent to the true probability distribution. To prove our result, we in-
troduce the notion of eﬀectively identical beliefs as the set of probability
distributions for some trader that are consistent with the same overall equi-
librium. Given an initial economy and its corresponding equilibrium, if some
trader were to adopt beliefs that are eﬀectively identical to his original be-
liefs, then the new equilibrium outcome would remain unchanged. We then
show that the set of eﬀectively identical beliefs is a singleton under com-
plete markets. By contrast, this set is not a singleton in incomplete markets.
Moreover, there exists a probability distribution that belongs to this set that
is not equivalent to the truth. This has straightforward and important con-
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sequences for belief selection in incomplete markets. Suppose that a trader
survives, our first result shows that there are probability distributions that
are not equivalent to the truth which are consistent with his survival. Hence
incomplete markets fail to select for traders with correct expectations.
While our first result shows that incomplete markets select for a wide
range of beliefs, our second result shows that surviving traders whose beliefs
are incorrect aﬀect asset prices.We consider a two-trader economy and the
corresponding no-trade outcome. Assuming that the first trader has correct
beliefs, we can assign a discount factor and beliefs to the other trader such
that she is more impatient than the first trader, has incorrect beliefs and
survives. These beliefs matter because the equilibrium price sequence of
assets would change were she to adopt beliefs that are correct. This is because
the truth does not lie within her set of eﬀectively identical beliefs. Hence
traders with incorrect beliefs who survive need not behave as though they
know the truth. Note that these results do not hold in comparable complete
markets economies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we summarise the
existing literature. In section 3, we present the model: we start by providing
the intuition for our main results in a simple two-period model (subsection
3.1), then we go on to describe the infinite horizon economy which always
admits an equilibrium with a transversality condition. Section 4 contains
our first result. Section 5 contains our second result. Section 6 concludes the
paper. For ease of exposition, all proofs are in the appendix.
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2 Related Literature
The first attempts to validate the market selection hypothesis date back to
the early 90s and address the related issue of whether markets select for ra-
tionality, with particular focus on the survival of noise traders. Shefrin and
Statman [17] ask whether noise traders survive in financial markets by de-
veloping a model where rational and informed Bayesian traders interact with
traders that make systematic cognitive errors. They show that, provided that
noise traders are patient enough and that they do not commit errors that
are “too serious”, they will not be driven to extinction by informed traders.
De Long et al. [10] and [11] prove that noise traders can eventually come to
dominate the market, if they unwillingly happen to make “good” cognitive
mistakes. Biais and Shadur [5] consider a market where non-overlapping gen-
erations of buyers and sellers trade to share risk. They show that irrational
traders, who misperceive the risk but enjoy a higher bargaining power, might
outperform rational traders who correctly assess the distribution of the risk.
While this literature assumes asset prices to be exogenous, the paper by
Blume and Easley [8] addresses the same problem in a market model, where
asset prices are determined endogenously and reflect the dynamics of the
wealth shares of the diﬀerent types of traders, each represented by a portfo-
lio rule. They find that, as long as traders save at the same rate, markets
do not select for rationality, but rather for a specific attitude towards risk.
In particular logarithmic utility maximisers with accurate beliefs accumulate
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wealth at a faster rate than any other trader. As a result, they determine
asset prices asymptotically and drive to extinction any other trader. Hence
within this framework markets do not select necessarily for rationality, but
rather for a specific portfolio rule. Irrational traders, or traders with inac-
curate expectations, may well survive if their mistakes or irrationality imply
that their portfolio rules are closer to the portfolio rule of a log maximiser.
On the other hand, rational traders with correct expectations may well van-
ish, if they happen to have the wrong attitude towards risk.
The results from this early literature are important in that they formalise
through wealth dynamics what one might mean by market selection. They
are also quite provocative because they make it very clear that expected
utility maximisation and survival are distinct objectives. Hence rational
behaviour is not necessarily selected for by market forces and the market
selection hypothesis need not hold within this setting.
Sandroni [15] adopts the same notion of market selection and survival as
in Blume and Easley [8], but diﬀers from the earlier contributions in that
he considers not only portfolio decisions but also savings decisions to be
endogenous. In a Lucas trees complete markets economy where traders are
expected utility maximisers and discount the future at the same rate, he
finds that under mild conditions on traders’ utility functions, only traders
with correct beliefs survive. Hence, among rational traders, complete markets
select for correct beliefs.
Blume and Easley [9] generalise Sandroni’s result to any Pareto optimal
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allocation. For any optimal allocation, survival of traders is determined
entirely by beliefs and discount factors; in contrast with [8], risk attitudes do
not matter for survival. Among traders who discount future consumption at
the same rate, it is those with most accurate beliefs that survive, irrespective
of their utility function. In particular, if there are traders whose beliefs merge
with the truth, they will be the only survivors. Blume and Easley [9] provide
two interesting counterexamples that show that the same results need not
carry through under market incompleteness, where in general allocations are
not Pareto optimal.
In this paper we prove for a large class of incomplete markets economies
that surviving traders need not have beliefs that merge with the true proba-
bility distribution. The fact that, under incomplete markets, opportunities to
trade are restricted implies that traders with incorrect beliefs are not wiped
out by market forces. As a result surviving traders’ beliefs do not necessar-
ily merge either with the truth or with other traders’ beliefs, and so beliefs’
heterogeneity is persistent and may matter (see section 5).
3 The Model
3.1 A Two-Period Example
Consider a two period economy with a unique consumption good and where
there are S possible states of the world tomorrow. Time is indexed by t = 0, 1.
Traders can trade J ≤ S securities whose period 1 payoﬀ is the full rank
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S × J matrix A. They trade these securities to hedge against their period 1
stochastic endowment ω ∈ RS++. Consumption takes place in period 1 only.
In an equilibrium, period 0 asset prices q ∈ RJ++ have to satisfy the no
arbitrage equation:
q =
πi1
πi0
A (1)
where πi1 ∈ RS++ is trader i’s utility gradient and where πi0 ∈ R++ is a mul-
tiplier. The resulting ratio π
i
1
πi0
is trader i’s normalized utility gradient or his
state price vector. In the complete markets case, we get the usual condition
that this ratio is equated across traders.2 Note that πi1 (s) = ρi(s)vi0(xi(s))
when traders have preferences of the expected utility form and their beliefs
are represented by the probability distribution ρi. In the complete markets
case, given an equilibrium outcome (x∗, q∗), there exists only one set of be-
liefs (an S−dimensional normalized vector ρi) such that q∗πi0 = πi1A where
πi1 (s) = ρi(s)vi(x∗i(s)). This is because there are S equations in S unknowns.
The only solution is the original normalized vector ρi ∈ RS.
In the incomplete markets case, J < S and this system of equations
may have multiple solutions. To guarantee multiple solutions to the no-
arbitrage equation, one needs to assume that J < S − 1. The additional
degree of freedom is used to ensure that the resulting solution is a probability
distribution. So, given an economy and a resulting equilibrium outcome,
2Equation (1) can be given the familiar form q = ψE(V ) where the expectation is
taken with respect to some probability distribution. In the complete markets case, this
probability distribution is unique. The scalar ψ represents the price of a bond that pays
oﬀ one unit of consumption in each state (if that bond exists).
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and for any trader i ∈ I, there exist many probability distributions that are
consistent with the original equilibrium: The latter is also an equilibrium of
any economy where all traders’ preferences remain unchanged, except for
trader i. His beliefs can be any λi 6= ρi such that q = πi01πi0A where π
i0
1
now represents trader i’s utility gradient under the new beliefs λi. When
J < S− 1, these beliefs exist. The intuition of this analysis is essentially the
same in infinite horizon economies and ultimately drives our main result.
Turning to the case of infinite horizon economies, suppose that traders
trade the same set of short-lived securities whose payoﬀ next period is the
matrix A. The no arbitrage equation takes the form:
q(st) =
πit+1(st)
πi(st)
A (2)
where πit+1(st) ∈ RS++ is trader i’s utility gradient for period t + 1 when
the current state of the world is st and where πi(st) ∈ R++ is the marginal
utility of consumption in node st of the date-event tree. Again, we consider
the case of expected utility maximizers. Consider a particular economy and
the resulting equilibrium outcome. Suppose that trader i ∈ I has beliefs rep-
resented by a probability distribution ρi. We wish to construct a probability
distribution λi 6= ρi such that the original equilibrium is still an equilibrium
when trader i ad opts beliefs λi. We do this by rewriting the no arbitrage
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equation (2):
qt = ρi(t+ 1|st)M i(st) (3)
Where ρi(t + 1|st) ∈ RS++ is the conditional probability distribution of
period t + 1 events, conditioning on the current state of the world st and
where M i(st) is an S × J matrix determined in equilibrium. We show that
there exists a unique probability distribution ρi which satisfies equation (3)
in the complete markets case. When J < S − 1, one can choose conditional
probabilities λi(t + 1|st) 6= ρi(t + 1|st) for each node in the date-event tree.
Then one can construct a probability distribution λi over infinite events by
using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem. This implies that in the incomplete
markets case, one can choose a probability distribution λi that is eﬀectively
identical to ρi but such that λi 6= ρi.
One can also choose λi such that λi and ρi are not equivalent. This
requires that the marginals ρi(t+1|st) are uniformly bounded away from the
edges of the unit simplex. We can then choose λi uniformly bounded away
from ρi. The theorem of Blackwell and Dubins [7] then implies that these
distributions cannot be equivalent.
It follows that in an incomplete markets economy, observing a trader
survive does not imply that his beliefs are equivalent to the truth. The
above procedure can be used to construct beliefs for this trader that are
not equivalent to the truth but that guarantee his survival in a way that is
identical to the original economy. This is in contrast to the complete markets
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or Pareto eﬃcient economy. In these economies and controlling for discount
factors, traders who survive must have the truth be absolutely continuous
with respect to their beliefs.
The second result, presented in section 5, shows that one can change both
a trader’s discount factor (by making her more impatient, for example) and
her beliefs. If her beliefs are chosen such that the marginals are bounded
away from the unit simplex, then one can find beliefs eﬀectively identical to
these new beliefs that are far away from the truth. The outcome is that this
trader will survive and her wrong beliefs will influence equilibrium prices.
3.2 The Infinite Horizon Economy
The economy we model is a special case of the economy analyzed by Mag-
ill and Quinzii [14]. Our notation combines elements of [14], Araujo and
Sandroni [3] and Sandroni [15]. Let T = {0, 1, ..} denote the set of time
periods. Every period, the set of possible states is T = {1, .., S}, S ∈ N.
T t is the t−Cartesian product of T . Let S = {s0} × T∞ be the set of
all possible infinite sequences of T where s0 ∈ T acts as the root element.
Throughout, we use the notation st = (s0, s1, .., st) for an element st ∈ T t.
All elements are taken to have {s0} as root so st ∈ T t necessarily means
st = {s0} × ht−1 where ht−1 ∈ T t−1. We can represent the information reve-
lation process in this economy through a sequence of finite partitions of the
state space S. In particular, define the cylinder with base on st ∈ T t, t ∈ T
as C(st) = {s ∈ T∞|s = (st, ..)}. Let Ft = {C(st) : st ∈ T t} be a partition
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of the set S. Clearly, F =(F0, ..,Ft, ..) denotes a sequence of finite parti-
tions of S such that F0 = {S} and Ft is finer3 than Ft−1. We assume that
all traders have identical information and that the information revelation
process is represented by the sequence F. Let D =∪t∈T,σt∈Ft (t, σt) denote the
date-event tree and D+ = D−{(0, σ0)} = D−{s0}. We use the short-hand
notation st ∈ D, meaning (t, σt) ∈ D where σt = C(st). DT (st) denotes the
subset of successor nodes of st at date T , i.e. all elements sT ∈ T T such that
sT = (st, ..). Let Ft be the set consisting of all finite unions of cylinders with
base on T t. It is easily shown that Ft is a σ−field. Note that Ft = σ (Ft).
Define F0 as the trivial σ−field. Let F = σ (∪t∈NFt). It can be shown that
{Ft}t∈N is a filtration. Let ρi be trader i’s beliefs on S represented by a prob-
ability measure on (T∞,F). Let Eρi be the expectation operator associated
with ρi. Let Eρi(.|Ft)(s) = Eρit (.)(s) be the expectation operator associated
with ρist when s = (st, ..) and where:
ρist(K) =
ρi((T t ×K) ∩ C(st))
ρi(C(st))
for any K ∈ S such that T t ×K ∈ F
There are I= {1, .., I} infinitely lived traders, L = {1, .., L} goods at each
node. So D× L is the set of all goods over all nodes. Let RD×L denote the
vector space of all maps x : D× L→ R. Let l∞(D× L) denote sequences
x ∈ RD×L such that sup(st,l)∈D×L |xl(st)| <∞, the subspace of bounded maps.
Let kxk∞ = sup(st,l)∈D×L |xl(st)| denote the sup-norm of l∞(D× L). Also, let
3σt ∈ Ft, σt−1 ∈ Ft−1 implies that either σt ⊂ σt−1 or σt ∩ σt−1 = ∅.
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l1(D× L) denote sequences such that
X
(st,l)∈D×L
|xl(st)| <∞. Agent i has
endowment ω ∈ l+∞(D× L) = {x ∈ l∞(D× L) : xl(st) ≥ 0 for all ξ, l}.4 Let
X i = l+∞(D× L) denote trader i’s consumption set. Let p ∈ RD×L be the spot
price process and set p(st, 1) = 1 for all st ∈ D so 1 is the numeraire good.5
Further, we consider only short-lived numeraire securities. Let J(st) be the
set of securities issued at node st ∈ T t. j(st) = #J(st) < ∞ is the number
of securities. Aj(st, s) is the payoﬀ of security j ∈ J(st) in the immediate
successor node (st, s) ∈ T t+1. A(st, s) =
£
A1(st, s), .., Aj(st)(st, s)
¤
is the
1×j(st) vector of security payoﬀs in immediate successor node (st, s) ∈ T t+1.
Finally, letAt+1(st) denote the S×j(st)matrix of payoﬀs in period t+1. Also,
A = (A(st, s) : (st, s) ∈ D+, t ∈ T) ∈ Πst∈DRS×j(st) is the process of security
payoﬀs. We assume that all securities pay oﬀ in terms of the numeraire good.
Let q(st) = (qj(st) : j ∈ J(st)) be the 1 × j(st) vector of node st security
prices. q = (q(st) : st ∈ D) ∈ Πst∈DRJ(st) = Q be the security price process,
an element of the security price space. zi = (zi(st) : st ∈ D) ∈ Πst∈DRJ(st) =
Z be the portfolio process for trader i, an element of the portfolio space,
where zi(st) =
¡
zij(st) : j ∈ J(st)
¢
is the j(st)× 1 portfolio vector of trader i
at node st.
Let ºi represent trader i0s preference ordering over X i. Preferences ºi
4Bewley [4] and subsequently Magill and Quinzii [14] impose the condition of Mackey
contituity on traders’ preferences. The Mackey topology on l∞(D× L) is described in [4].
5We can do this because securities in this economy pay only in terms of the numeraire
good.
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are represented by an additively separable utility function:
ui(xi) =
X
st∈T t,t∈T
ρi(C(st))δ
t(s)
i v
i(xi(st)) = Eρ
i
"X
t∈T
δtiv
i(xit)
#
Where ρi(C(st)) is the probability of st ∈ T t, δi ∈ (0, 1) is an intertempo-
ral discount factor and vi : RL+ → R is a continuous, increasing and concave
function with vi(0) = 0. These assumptions on the utility function satisfy
Mackey continuity (as shown in [4]).6 Let º= (º1, ..,ºI), ω =
¡
ω1, .., ωI
¢
.
Finally, let E∞(D,º, ω, A) denote the economy. When all traders’ prefer-
ences are of the expected utility form, let ρ =
¡
ρ1, .., ρI
¢
, δ = (δ1, .., δI) and
v =
¡
v1, .., vI
¢
then E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) denote the economy in question.
Assumption A Endowments are uniformly bounded away from zero and
aggregate endowments are uniformly bounded. Formally, there is an
m > 0 such that ωil(st) > m for all i, st, l; moreover there is an m0 >
m > 0 such that
X
i
ωil(st) < m0 for all st, l.
Assumption B There exists a riskless bond at every node st ∈ D. Formally,
there is a j ∈ J(st) so that Aj(st, s) = 1 for all s ∈ T .
Assumption B can be replaced with the condition that for each node st ∈
D, there exists a portfolio of securities z ∈ RJ(st) such that
X
j
Aj(st, s)zj >
0 for all s ∈ T.
6[2] shows that Mackey continuity is needed to prove existence of an equilibrum in
economies with infinitely many commodities.
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In this economy, assumptions A and B satisfy all conditions needed (see
section 3 of [14]) for the existence of an equilibrium in open-ended incomplete
markets economies. They are assumed to hold throughout this paper.
3.3 Equilibrium with a Transversality Condition
With the assumption that zi(s−1) = 0, and that preferences are strictly
monotone, the trader’s budget constraint at node st ∈ D is:
p(st)
¡
xi(st)− ωi(st)
¢
= A(st)zi(st−1)− q(st)zi(st) for all st ∈ D (4)
In infinite horizon economies, a trader can borrow and roll over his debt
ad infinitum. So we need a transversality condition to ensure that there is a
bound on the rate at which the trader accumulates debt.
lim
T→∞
X
sT∈DT (st)
πi(sT )q(sT )zi(sT ) = 0 for all st ∈ D (5)
So the budget set for trader i is:
BTC∞ (p, q, πi, ωi, A) =
©
xi ∈ l+∞(D× L) : ∃zi ∈ Z satisfying (4) and (5)
ª
Definition 1 An equilibrium of the economy E∞(D,º, ω, A) is a pair (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) ∈
l+∞(D× L×I)×ZI × RD×L ×Q× l+1 (D× I) such that:
1. (xi, zi) is ºimaximal in BTC∞ (p, q, πi, ωi, A)
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2. for each i ∈ I:
(a) πi(st) > 0,for all st ∈ D and P i ∈ l+1 (D× L) where P i = (P i(st), st ∈
D) = (πi(st)p(st), st ∈ D)
(b) xi isºimaximal in B∞(P i, ωi) = {xi ∈ l+∞(D× L) : P i(xi − ωi) ≤ 0}
(c)
πi(st)qj(st) =
X
st+1=(st,s)
πi(st+1)Aj(st+1) for all j ∈ j(st), st ∈ D
(6)
3.
X
i∈I
(xi − ωi) = 0
4.
X
i∈I
zi = 0
Theorem 2 Each economy E∞(D,º, ω, A) satisfying the above assumptions
has an equilibrium.
Proof. Theorem 5.1 of [14].
The assumption that assets must be short-lived and must pay oﬀ in terms
of a numeraire good ensures that an equilibrium exists. Is it however only a
simplifying assumption as the results in this paper rest on analyzing the no
arbitrage equation which must hold in equilibrium regardless of the particular
asset structure.
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4 Belief Selection
4.1 Eﬀectively Identical Beliefs
The set of beliefs that a trader adopts that yield the same equilibrium out-
come is the set of eﬀectively identical beliefs for this trader, defined below.
Definition 3 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of an econ-
omy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω, A). We say that trader i’s beliefs ρi are eﬀectively iden-
tical to λi (a probability measure on (S,F)) if there exists an equilibrium
(x, z), (p, q, (ψi)i∈I) of the economy E∞ (D, ρ0, v, ω, A) where ρ0 =
¡
ρ1, .., ρi−1, λi, ρi+1, .., ρI
¢
.
We write ρi ∈
£
λi
¤i
.
A suﬃcient condition for a probability distribution ρi to be eﬀectively
identical to the beliefs of some trader is that the no-arbitrage equation (6) is
satisfied where πi(st) = ρi(C(st))δtivi1(xi(st)). As beliefs change, so does the
way traders value the future. Hence, the definition imposes that equilibrium
allocations and prices are identical for diﬀerent (but eﬀectively identical)
beliefs. The resulting state price process for trader i is diﬀerent precisely
because the probability distributions ρi and λi are diﬀerent.
Equilibrium security prices can reveal some information about a trader’s
beliefs. The price of a security in node st represents trader i’s marginal util-
ity of consuming the stream of this security’s payoﬀ across successor nodes.
Along with a trader’s actual consumption over these nodes, one can extract
some information about this trader’s beliefs over successor nodes. In a com-
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plete markets economy, security prices reveal these beliefs perfectly. Equilib-
rium security prices and consumption for a given node st can be summarized
in the no-arbitrage equation:
qt = ρi(t+ 1|st)M i(st) (7)
M i(st) is a matrix determined by the equilibrium consumption of trader
i in successor nodes of st. This is the traditional no-arbitrage equation (6)
rewritten to make trader i’s conditional beliefs more apparent. Given an
equilibrium, this trader’s conditional beliefs can then be extracted from this
equation. These conditional beliefs, over all nodes, can be then put together
to construct beliefs over the whole σ−field. We say that an economy E∞(D,º
, ω, A) has complete markets if j(st) = b(st) for all st ∈ D and the S × j(st)
matrix At+1(st) has full rank for all st ∈ D. The complete markets result is
summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of a com-
plete markets economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of eﬀectively identical
beliefs for each trader is a singleton.
In contrast, equation (7) doesn’t determine trader i’s conditional be-
liefs uniquely when markets are incomplete, because there are fewer secu-
rity prices. This is shown in the next proposition, which makes use of the
following
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Assumption 1 (Markets are Incomplete at Some Node) There exists a finite
path s˜t˜ ∈ T t˜ such that Rank[At˜+1(s˜t˜)] < S − 1.
This assumption is stronger than the usual one for market incompleteness.
The additional degree of freedom is used in the proof of the next proposition
to ensure that candidate solutions to equation (7) are probability distribu-
tions.
Proposition 5 Under assumption 1, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an
equilibrium of an incomplete markets economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the
set of eﬀectively identical beliefs for each trader is not a singleton.
The above proposition has some straightforward implications in terms of
belief selection in incomplete markets. Let ρ be the true probability distri-
bution on (S,F). We say that trader i has rational expectations (or correct
beliefs) if ρi = ρ. Blume and Easley [9] define survival of trader i on a path
s ∈ S if lim supt xi(st) > 0. An implication of the above propositions in the
incomplete markets case is that each trader with rational expectations has
eﬀectively identical beliefs which are not correct. Also, each trader that sur-
vives ρ−almost surely has eﬀectively identical beliefs which are not correct.
Suppose we can observe all aspects of the economy except traders’ beliefs.
Then, given an equilibrium of that economy, we could not conclude that a
trader who survives has correct beliefs. This definition of belief correctness
is however very strong. A trader whose conditional beliefs are identical to
the truth in all nodes except one node, has incorrect beliefs. In the Pareto
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optimal economy discussed in Blume and Easley [9], this trader may survive
(if we control for other factors).
4.2 Homogeneity of Beliefs
Blume and Easley [9] show that a necessary condition for survival is that the
truth is absolutely continuous with the beliefs of traders who survive. This
formalizes the market selection hypothesis, that traders with incorrect beliefs
are driven out of the market. Here, belief correctness refers to the concept of
equivalence of a trader’s beliefs with the truth. In this section, we show that
survival in incomplete markets is consistent with beliefs not equivalent to
the truth. To construct these beliefs, we require that all traders’ conditional
probabilities should be uniformly bounded away from the edges of the unit
simplex by some ε0 > 0.This ensures that eﬀectively identical beliefs can
be chosen suﬃciently far away from original beliefs, thus allowing "suﬃcient
room for disagreement" from a trader’s original beliefs.
Assumption 2 There must exist an ε0 > 0 such that the ε0−ball7 Bε0(ρ(.|st)) ⊂
RS++ for all st ∈ D+.
The first step is to construct eﬀectively identical beliefs that are not equiv-
alent to a trader’s original beliefs. We do this by constructing conditional
beliefs uniformly bounded away from original beliefs, we then use Blackwell
7We use the sup norm (kxkS = supi∈S |xi|).
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and Dubin’s theorem to show that these new beliefs cannot be equivalent to
original beliefs. We recall the following definition and result.
Definition 6 Agent i ∈ I and j ∈ I’s beliefs eventually become homogeneous
if there is a set A ∈ F such that : P k(A) = 1 for k = i, j and for all s ∈ A,
supB∈F |P ist(B)− P jst(B)|→ 0 as t→∞.
Proposition 7 If two probability measures are equivalent (meaning: ρi(B) =
0⇔ ρj(B) = 0 for all B ∈ F) then the posterior probabilities eventually be-
come homogeneous.
Proof. Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Evidently, we must strengthen our notion of market incompleteness to
ensure that we can choose eﬀectively identical conditional beliefs suﬃciently
far away from original beliefs, infinitely often.
Assumption 3 (Markets are Suﬃciently Incomplete Infinitely Often) For
each i ∈ I, there exists a set Ai ∈ F of positive measure ρi such that
Rank[At+1(st)] < S − 1 i.o. on each path s ∈ Ai.
A suﬃcient condition for assumption 2 is that markets are incomplete at
every node in the tree with Rank(Aj(st, t+ 1)) < S − 1.
Proposition 8 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I)
is an equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of eﬀectively
identical beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to ρi.
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The main result of this paper is an implication of the following corollary.
Corollary 9 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I)
is an equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then the set of eﬀectively
identical beliefs for trader i ∈ I contains beliefs not equivalent to the true
probability distribution ρ.
Proof. If trader i’s beliefs are not equivalent to ρ, then we’re done. If they
are, use the previous proposition.
If we can observe all aspects of the economy except for traders’ beliefs,
then given an equilibrium, a trader who survives ρ−a.s. has beliefs consistent
with this survival that are not equivalent to ρ. This is in contrast to the
Pareto optimal result of Blume and Easley [9]. Note that our result doesn’t
rely on assumptions about discount factors, or even the precise definition
of survival. This is because it is the no-arbitrage equation along with the
asset structure that determines a trader’s set of eﬀectively identical beliefs,
in particular a surviving trader’s beliefs.
We also obtain the result that two traders who survive may strongly
disagree about the truth. This is a direct implication of the following
Corollary 10 Under assumptions 2 and 3, suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I)
is an equilibrium of an economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A) then each trader has
eﬀectively identical beliefs that are not equivalent to another trader’s beliefs.
Finally, note that in incomplete markets economies with Pareto eﬃcient
outcomes, all traders beliefs must converge with the truth (see for example
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Sandroni [15]). Because of the asset structure, we may construct eﬀectively
identical beliefs for the surviving traders that do not merge with the truth. In
this case, the original outcome is still an equilibrium but it is no longer Pareto
eﬃcient: so any incomplete markets equilibrium outcome where traders with
incorrect beliefs survive almost surely with respect to the truth must be
Pareto eﬃcient. This result is expected since outcomes are generically Pareto
ineﬃcient in incomplete markets economies, but it shows that the above
results are not in contradiction with previous work on belief selection in
Pareto eﬃcient economies.
5 Survival in a Two Trader Economy
We have shown that incomplete markets select for a wide range of beliefs,
including beliefs that do not merge with the truth. However when all surviv-
ing traders have beliefs that are eﬀectively identical to the truth, incorrect
expectations may not aﬀect the asset price process. As a result, incomplete
markets may select for beliefs that are incorrect in ways that are irrelevant
for survival. In a simple two-trader economy, we show that traders with
incorrect beliefs may both survive and aﬀect asset prices.
We consider an economy with two identical traders i and j and the cor-
responding no-trade outcome. Initially, we assume that both traders know
the truth. Because there is no trade, both traders survive according to any
probability distribution. We modify the economy by assigning trader i a dif-
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ferent discount factor and diﬀerent beliefs such that the no-trade outcome is
still an equilibrium of the new economy. Trader i’s discount factor is chosen
in a deleted neighborhood of trader j’s discount factor. Trader i’s beliefs are
chosen such that the truth does not lie in her set of eﬀectively identical be-
liefs. Trader i survives according to the truth. This occurs in the presence of
trader j, who knows the truth (and who survives). For simplicity, we assume
that markets are incomplete at all nodes.
Assumption 3’ (Markets are Incomplete at all Nodes) There are S states
of the world each period, and Rank[At+1(st)] = J < S for all st ∈ D.
Assumption 4 Traders have identical Bernoulli utilities v and identical en-
dowment processes ω ∈ l∞(D× L) uniformly bounded away from zero
and infinity. Given these processes, [At+1(st)] lies outside a closed set
of measure zero of endowments A∗(st) ⊂ RSJ for all st ∈ D.
The sets A∗(st) are constructed in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Suppose that assumptions 2, 3’ and 4 hold. Consider an
economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω,A) with two identical traders i and j and consider
the corresponding no trade outcome. There exists a deleted neighborhood N
of δj such that for all discount factors (δ0)i for trader i within that neigh-
borhood N , there exist beliefs (ρ0)i such that the no trade outcome is also an
equilibrium for the economy E 0∞ (D, ρ0, δ0, v, ω, A) where ρ0 =
³
(ρ0)i , ρj
´
and
δ0 =
³
(δ0)i , δj
´
. We have the following properties in the new economy E 0∞.
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1. Trader i survives λ− a.s. for any λ ∈ [ρj ]j ;
2. λ /∈
h
(ρ0)i
ii
;
3. (ρ0)i can be chosen such that λ is not equivalent to (ρ0)i.
Trader i’s incorrect beliefs may be far from the truth (property #3) and
these beliefs matter (property #2): if trader i were to adopt correct beliefs
λ, equilibrium prices will change and she may no longer survive λ−a.s. Note
that trader i may be chosen so that she is more impatient than the other
trader.
For example, if endowments and payoﬀs are stationary and beliefs and the
truth are iid, Blume and Easley [9] show that a trader who survives almost
surely with respect to the truth must have the highest survival index8. Here,
trader i may be chosen to be more impatient and have incorrect beliefs so
her survival index is smaller than trader j’s, yet she survives λ− a.s.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we model an infinite horizon economy, with a view to testing
the market selection hypothesis under market incompleteness. We know
from the literature (Sandroni [15], Blume and Easley [9]) that markets with
a Pareto optimal outcome or, more narrowly, complete markets select for
correct beliefs. All surviving traders have correct beliefs (i.e. beliefs that can
8 log δk− Iρ(ρk) where δk is trader k’s discount factor and Iρ(ρk) is the relative entropy
of trader k’s beliefs with respect to the truth.
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be represented by probability distributions that merge with the truth). Both
wealth and consumption of traders whose beliefs are incorrect converge to
zero with true probability one. Hence in the long run heterogeneity of beliefs
is not persistent and market outcomes reflect the true probability distribution
over returns.
The motivation for our study lies in two counterexamples provided by
Blume and Easley [9] that point to the fact that the same need not hold under
market incompleteness. In this paper we show that incomplete markets do
not select for correct beliefs. In particular we prove that when markets are
incomplete the set of beliefs that is consistent with a trader’s survival admits
beliefs which are not equivalent to the truth, and these incorrect beliefs may
matter.
We build our first result on the characterisation of the set of eﬀectively
identical beliefs. Given an economy and its corresponding equilibrium, this is
the set of beliefs for a trader that are consistent with the same equilibrium al-
location and prices. If a trader had to adopt diﬀerent beliefs belonging to this
set, the equilibrium outcome would remain unchanged. We show that, while
in complete market economies the set of eﬀectively identical beliefs admits
only one element, under market incompleteness this set is not a singleton.
Moreover, it always admits probability distributions that are not equivalent
to the truth. This result holds for all traders and in particular for surviving
traders. Hence one can always find beliefs that diﬀer significantly from the
true probability distribution and that still allow a trader to survive and have
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an impact on market outcomes in the long run.
An immediate corollary of our result is that heterogeneity of beliefs is
persistent: surviving traders need not share the same beliefs in the long run.
Under incomplete markets asset prices reflect a range of underlying proba-
bility distributions that generate them. These distributions oﬀer conflicting
evidence on the probability of some events and influence asset prices.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Preliminary
The following proposition is used in the proof of proposition (5) .
Proposition 12 Suppose that (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium of an
economy E∞ (D, ρ, δ, v, ω, A). Let
¡
λi
¢
i∈I be probability distributions on (S,F)
such that:
qj(st) =
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(C(st+1))δivi1(xi(st+1))
λi(C(st))vi1(xi(st))
Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Then
¡
λi
¢
i∈I are eﬀectively identical to (ρi)i∈I.
Proof. Set:
ψi(st) = δtiv
i
1(x
i(st))λi(C(st)) for all st ∈ T t, t ∈ T
So the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied:
ψi(st)qj(st) =
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ψi(st+1)Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Note that the other FOCs of trader i’s optimization problem are satisfied.
Indeed, we know that:
ρi(C(st))δtiv
i
l(x
i(st)) = πi(st)pl(st) for all st ∈ T t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
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So that:
ρi(C(st))δti
πi(st)
vil(x
i(st)) = pl(st) for all st ∈ T t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So that (with p1(st) = 1):
pl(st)
p1(st)
= pl(st) =
vil(xi(st))
vi1(xi(st))
for all st ∈ T t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So, given that:
δtiv
i
1(x
i(st))λi(C(st)) = ψi(st) for all st ∈ T t, t ∈ T (8)
It follows that:
δti
vil(xi(st))
pl(st)
λi(C(st)) = ψi(st) for all st ∈ T t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
Or:
λi(C(st))δtiv
i
l(x
i(st)) = ψi(st)pl(st) for all st ∈ T t, l ∈ L, t ∈ T
So all FOCs are satisfied. Since (x, z), (p, q, (πi)i∈I) is an equilibrium
with transversality condition for the economy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω,A), it follows
from theorem 5.2 of [14] that ((x, z), (p, q)) is an equilibrium with implicit
debt constraint for the economy E∞ (D, ρ, v, ω,A). So (qzi) ∈ l∞(D) for all
i ∈ I. So ((x, z), (p, q)) is an equilibrium with implicit debt constraint for the
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economy E∞(D,º0, ω,A). Since preferences in the economy E∞(D,º0, ω, A)
satisfy assumptions A1−A6 in [14], theorem 5.2 of [14] implies the existence
of present value vectors νi, i ∈ I so that (x, z), (p, q, (νi)i∈I) is an equilibrium
with transversality condition for the economy E∞(D,º0, ω,A). Incidentally,
it follows that νi = ψi for all i ∈ I, since (νi)i∈I satisfies equation (8).
7.2 Proof of Proposition (4)
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists an equilibrium (x, z), (p, q, (ψi)i∈I)
where trader i’s preferences are represented by the expected utility Eλi
hX
t∈T
δtivi(xit)
i
.
Note that (ψi)i∈I must satisfy:
qj(st) =
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ψi(st+1)
ψi(st)
Aj(st+1) for all st ∈ T t, j ∈ J, t ∈ T
Set ψit+1(st) =
¡
ψi(st, 1), .., ψi(st, S)
¢
. So, the above equation in matrix
form is:
q(st) =
ψit+1(st)
ψi(st)
At+1(st) for all st ∈ T t, t ∈ T
Where At+1(st) is an S×j(st) matrix and q(st) is a 1×j(st) vector. Since
markets are complete, A is square and has full rank. So the above equation
has a unique solution, which we know is
πit+1(st)
πi(st) . Hence
ψit+1(st)
ψi(st) =
πit+1(st)
πi(st)
for all st ∈ T t, t ∈ T. Finally, in period 0, ψ(s0) = π(s0) by construction.
So ψi = πi. So equation (8) implies that λi(C(st)) = ρi(C(st)) for s =
(st, ..) ∈ S. So λi and ρi agree on sets in ∪t∈NFt. This set is closed under
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finite intersections and hence is a π−system. The π − λ theorem and it’s
implication (theorem 3.3 in [6]) in turn implies that λi = ρi, a contradiction.
7.3 Proof of Proposition (5)
Proof. Choose a process λi(C(st)) ∈ [0, 1] for all st ∈ D so that λi(C(s0)) =
1 and:
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
£
δivi1(x
i(st+1))Aj(st+1)
¤
λi(C(st+1)) = vi1(x
i(st))qj(st)λi(C(st))X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(C(st+1)) = λi(C(st))
Then, by Kolmogorov’s Existence Theorem [see theorem 36.1 in Billings-
ley [6]], λi is a probability distribution on (T∞,F), proposition (12) applies
and
¡
λi
¢
i∈I are eﬀectively identical to (ρ
i)i∈I. We simplify this system by
rewriting it.
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
£
δivi1(x
i(st+1))Aj(st+1)
¤
λi(st+1|st) = vi1(xi(st))qj(st) (9)X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
λi(st+1|st) = 1
Given a process λi(st+1|st), one can reconstruct a probability distribution
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on (T∞,F) by setting, recursively:
λi(C(s1)) = λi(s1|s0)λi(C(s0)) = λi(s1|s0) for all s1 = (s0, s)
λi(C(st+1)) = λi(st+1|st)λi(C(st)) for all st+1 = (st, s) for t ∈ T− {0}
Set λi(.|st) = ρi(.|st) for all st 6= s˜t˜. λi(.|s˜t˜) is chosen such that λi(.|s˜t˜) 6=
ρi(.|s˜t˜) and such that system of equations (9) is satisfied (this is possible
because markets are incomplete, see below). Then the resulting probability
distribution λi is diﬀerent from ρi but eﬀectively identical to ρi, by proposi-
tion (12) in section (7.1) .
How to choose an appropriate λi(.|s˜t˜) 6= ρi(.|s˜t˜): Note that the set of
equations in (9) can be rewritten as:
M i(st)λi(.|st) = q(st)
Where:
M i(st) =
δi
vi1(xi(st))
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
vi1(xi(s1t+1))A1(s1t+1) ... vi1(xi(sSt+1))A1(sSt+1)
...
. . .
...
vi1(xi(s1t+1))AJ(s1t+1) ... vi1(xi(sSt+1))AJ(sSt+1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Note that M i(s˜t˜) has full rank equal to the rank of At˜+1(s˜t˜, ) < S − 1.
Since we know that ρi(.|s˜t˜) solves the system of equations in (9), we know
the solution set Λ(s˜t˜) is linear and of dimension at least 1. We know that
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ρi(.|s˜t˜) ∈ RS++ and is interior to the unit simplex, by construction. Using the
sup norm (kxkS = supi∈S |xi|), choose an ε > 0 suﬃciently small such that
Bε(ρi(.|s˜t˜)) ⊂ RS++, and choose an element λ¯i(.|s˜t˜) ∈ Bε(ρi(.|s˜t˜))∩Λ(s˜t˜) such
that λ¯i(.|s˜t˜) 6= ρi(.|s˜t˜).
7.4 Proof of Proposition (8)
Proof. We use the construction in the proof of proposition (5) by choosing
ε = ε0 at the end of the proof. On each path s ∈ Ai, build a probability
distribution λi by choosing λi(.|st) ∈ [Bε0(ρi(.|st)) ∩ Λ(st)] − Bε0/2(ρi(.|st))
for all st, t ∈ T such that Rank(Aj(st, t+1)) < S−1 and such that s = (st, ..).
If the rank condition is not satisfied on these paths, choose λi(.|st) = ρi(.|st).
For paths s /∈ Ai, choose λi(.|st) = ρi(.|st).
For each path s ∈ Ai, we show that:
lim
t→+∞
sup
B∈G
|λist(B)− ρist(B)| ≥
ε0
2
(10)
Where G = {C(st) : s = (st, ..) for all t ∈ T}. Then we show that:
lim
t→+∞
sup
B∈G
|λist(B)− ρist(B)| ≤ limt→+∞ supB∈F |λ
i
st(B)− ρ
i
st(B)| when G ⊂ F (11)
This in turn implies that limt→+∞ supB∈F |λist(B)− ρist(B)| > 0 on a set
of paths that trader i assigns positive measure. Blackwell and Dubins’ result
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implies in turn that λiand ρi are not equivalent.
We now show inequality (10) . On a path s ∈ Ai, let at = supB∈G |λist(B)−
ρist(B)| and a = limt→+∞ at. Suppose that a < ε02 . Choose δ > 0 such that
Bδ(a) ∩ { ε02 } = ∅. There is a Tδ ∈ T such that t ≥ Tδ ⇒ |at − a| < δ. Since
at < ε02 for t ≥ Tδ, it follows that |λist(B) − ρist(B)| < ε02 for t ≥ Tδ. But
this contradicts the existence of a B ∈ G such that |λist(B) − ρist(B)| ≥ ε02
i.o. on path s ∈ Ai. Take B = C(st+1) where st+1 = (st, s) and where s is
chosen such that
¯¯
λi(s|st)− ρi(s|st)
¯¯
≥ ε0
2
. This s must exist by construction
of λi(.|st).
Inequality (11) is obvious: let at = supB∈G |λist(B) − ρist(B)| and a =
limt→+∞ at and bt = supB∈F |λist(B) − ρist(B)| and b = limt→+∞ bt. Suppose
that a > b. Let η = a − b > 0. Choose ε = η
4
. There exists a Tε ∈ T
such that t ≥ Tε ⇒ |at − a| < ε and |bt − b| < ε. So if t ≥ Tε, at > bt so
at > at+bt2 ≥ supB∈G |λist(B)−ρist(B)| so at is not the sup, a contradiction.
7.5 Proof of Proposition (11)
Proof. Consider an economy with 2 identical traders where ρ, δ, v, ω rep-
resent common beliefs, discount factors, Bernoulli utility and endowment
processes. Given the common endowment process, consider the matrices:
B (st) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
v1(ω
¡
s1t+1
¢
)A1(s1t+1) ... v1(ω
¡
sSt+1
¢
)A1(sSt+1)
...
. . .
...
v1(ω
¡
s1t+1
¢
)AJ(s1t+1) ... v1(ω
¡
sSt+1
¢
)AJ(sSt+1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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The set A∗(st) ⊂ RSJ is the set of all At+1(st) ∈ RSJ++ such that the 1×S
vector I = (1, .., 1) ∈ SpanB(st). So A∗(st) is the set of all payoﬀs such that
the matrix
⎡
⎢⎣
B(st)
I
⎤
⎥⎦ is not of full rank, a closed set of measure zero (this
is a direct application of the pre-image theorem. See pages 21 and 27 of
Guillemin and Pollack [13]).
Let (x, z), (p, q, (πk)k∈{i,j}) be the corresponding equilibrium outcome.
This is the no-trade equilibrium. The asset price process is therefore q(st) =
M(st)ρ(.|st) where M(st) = δB(st+1)v1(ω(st)) . This price process q ∈ l∞ (D×J). This
is because the endowment process is uniformly bounded away from zero and
from infinity. For each node st, choose μ(st) > 0 and ρi(.|st) >> 0 such that:
q(st)
(1 + μ (st))
=M(st)ρi(.|st) (12)
And such that: X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ρi(st+1|st) = 1 (13)
Rewriting equations (12) and (13), the system of equationsB(st+1)ρi(.|st) =
q(st)v1(ω(st))
δ(1+μ(st)) and
X
st+1∈{(st,s):s∈T}
ρi(st+1|st) = 1 has a non-empty solution set
because by construction,
⎡
⎢⎣
B(st)
I
⎤
⎥⎦ is of full rank less than or equal to S.
Denote this set by Λ(st). Choose μ(st) > 0 suﬃciently close to zero so that
Λ(st) ∩ B ε0
2
(ρ(.|st)) 6= ∅. This guarantees a solution ρi(.|st) ∈ RS++ which
is ε0
2
−bounded away from the unit simplex. Choose such (μ(st), ρi(.|st)) for
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all st, t ∈ T. Note that a unique μ = μ (st) can be chosen such that μ > 0.
This is because the price sequence q(st) is uniformly bounded. Using Kol-
mogorov’s existence theorem, construct a ρi, a probability distribution on
(S,F) that represents trader i’s beliefs whose marginals equal ρi(.|st), mar-
ginals that are ε0
2
−bounded away from the unit simplex. Also, choosing μ
such that δ (1 + μ) < 1, let δi = δ (1 + μ) represent trader i’s discount fac-
tor. Because q(st)
1+μ 6= q(st) for all st, t ∈ T, ρ /∈ [ρi]
i. This shows property #2.
Property #1 holds because it’s a no-trade equilibrium and endowments are
assumed uniformly bounded away from zero.
The same construction can be made by choosing μ such that μ < 0 <
δ (1 + μ) < 1 hence we can construct a small deleted neighborhood around
δ. Property #3 follows from the fact that ρi’s conditional probabilities are
uniformly bounded away from the unit simplex and proposition (8) applies.
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